Rationing can backfire : the day without a car in Mexico City by Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Feyzioglu, Tarhan
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  1554
Rationing Can Backfire  In Mexico  Ciy, a ban
restricting each car from
driving on a specified  work-
The "Day Without a Car"  day actually  increased  total
in Mexico City  driving and  congestion.





















































































































d|  POLICY RESEARCH WORKING  PAPER 1554
Summary  findings
In November  1989, Mexico City's administration  Some feel that it may be so inefficient that it is
imposed a regulation banning each car from driving on a  counterproductive.  And Eskeland and Feyzioglu found
specific day of the week. The regulation has been both  evidence to support that view. Many households bought
popular and controversial. Some feel that it is a  an additional car to get additional "driving permits," and
reasonable concession aimed to alleviate congestion and  the amount of driving increased. Greater use of old cars
pollution problems. Others feel it is both inefficient and  and increased weekend driving may have contributed to
unfair: inefficient in the way most rationing systems are  the disappointing results of Mexico's one-day ban on
inefficient, and unfair in that it is costly to some and  driving: high welfare costs and none of the intended
easily avoided or accommodated by others.  benefits.
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In November 1989, the Mexico City administration imposed a regulation that banned each
car from driving  a specific  day of the week'. The regulation has been both popular and controversial:
some feel is a reasonable concession from each car owner - aimed to  alleviate congestion and
pollution problems. Others have felt that it is inefficient and unfair; inefficient in the way most
rationing  devices  are inefficient, unfair because it will be particularly costly to some - easily avoided
or accommodated by others. Finally, some feel that the regulation may be so inefficient that it is
counterproductive  - increasing  the levels  of congestion and pollution - because some have purchased
additional  cars to circumvent the ban, and end up increasing their driving. The authors of this study
find evidence in support of the latter view.
This paper aims at analyzing this question in a pragmatic, policy oriented fashion. Section 2
briefly presents the idea that the effects of rationing can be analyzed by comparing the demand
reductions  with those one would obtain by market based implementation mechanisms - mechanisms
that  systematically rank  trips for  elimination according to  willingness to  pay.  This theoretical
framework  is sufficient to illustrate that rationing will entail at least as high welfare costs (using the
compensation criterion) as would  a market based mechanism producing the same reduction in
driving.
Section  3 presents an empirical  framework  for estimating the demand reductions provided by
the regulation.  A model of gasoline  demand is estimated  using aggregate time series data from before
the regulation, and used to simulate a counterfactual for demand in subsequent periods - as if the
regulation had not been introduced.
Surprisingly,  the results of the model are that the regulation  - after an initial adjustment period
of about six months - actually  increased  total driving  rather than reducing it. The result was surprising
because  the simple  theoretical  model allowed  for the possibility  that regulation should be a costly way
of reducing demand, but not that it should be counterproductive in reducing demand.
We pursue  the investigation  a little further by noting three particular features of this market:
Called  Hoy no circula  (this  one doesn't  circulate  today),  the "Day  without  a Car"  regulation  specifies  that  license  plate
numbers  ending  with  digits  0 or I does  not  drive  on  Monday,  2 or 3 not on Tuesday,  etc. The  regulation  applies  to all cars
(except  those  of the fire department),  and thus  to firms  as well as households.  We use  the term  household,  for simplicity.
Registration  officials  report that "Friday  plates"  are the least popular  among  licence  plate applicants. Compliance  is
generally  believed  to be high -police  is visible  and  fines  are heavy.2
(a) due to the integer nature of cars and the fact that cars effectively come bundled with "work-day
drivingpermits", some households will want more cars once their existing cars are made less useful
by the regulation;  (b) multiple  drivers in a family could mean that total car use increases even though
an additional  car is purchased primarily to substitute for the family's existing car on its banned day;
(c) effects of congestion, substitution between trips, and differences in fuel efficiency  all could blur
the basic  expected  reduction in gasoline consumption per car. Among these possibilities,  we are able
to investigate empirically  only (a) and (b). For (c) we can only add some tentative calculations of
plausible numbers.
In section  4, we estimate a car ownership model based on household survey data. The focus
is on the fact that cars come in lumpy units, while income and other explanatory variables are
continuous  variables.  Thus, a household owning  one car may be in an income range where it is almost
indifferent  between owning zero or one car, while another one-car household is indifferent between
owning one or two. When the regulation effectively expropriates a part of the car's  service flow,
some households in the first category will rather have no car, and some in the second category will
rather buy an additional one, to have two. Whether total demand for cars go up or not depends on
some coincidence  between the income distribution  of households and the income ranges in which the
first and second car purchases typically take place.
Our estimated model indicates that the groups are of about the same size - but there will be
somewhat  more car sellers than buyers. Thus, while increased ownership would have made it easier
to  understand the observed increase in total  gasoline consumption - our model (based on pre-
regulation  ownership  data) does not succeed in capturing and predicting such a response. We discuss
some known weaknesses  of the model that we are unable to address - in particular transaction costs
in the used car market - which would indicate that some "sellers" will decide not decide to sell (this
would be an asymmetric  correction to the model's predictions: no similar culling of "buyers" would
result from transaction costs).
In section 5, we discuss  the unresolved  puzzles  in the light of potential features that our model
may have failed to capture. Use per car might increase if trips substitute imperfectly for each other3
and if less convenient  travel is compensated for by more travel 2. Also, if conditions are congested on
workdays, and workday travel is sensitive to congestion, then removed work-day trips in part will
be compensated for by additional travel responding to reductions in congestion, so that a slight
increase  in week-end driving  can be enough to leave driving per car unchanged or increased. Finally,
casual observation  in Mexico City indicate  that many families  have bought an additional old car, with
the effect that Mexico City  has imported used cars from the rest of the country3. If these cars are less
fuel efficient,  then it is possible  that gasoline  consumption  would increase as a result of the regulation
even if aggregate car use was constant, or slightly reduced.
In section  6, we conclude  by making  two points:  (1) We highlight  our finding that car use was
increased (or at best held constant)  by the regulation,  but admit that there are remaining puzzles about
what  combination of specific mechanisms produced this result. (2) We remind the reader of the
original  empirical  question:  how does this rationing scheme compare to market based instruments in
terms  of  the  welfare costs  of  demand reductions?  That  question was, in  the  end,  rendered
uninteresting  - as the rationing  scheme  was found counterproductive  in delivering demand reductions.
With this finding, we also make no apology for not investigating whether the rationing scheme has
merits on distributional grounds that could compensate for its problems in the arena of efficiency.
2. Market Based Versus Regulatory Demand Management
Instruments  to economize  on polluting  trips may be gasoline  taxes, driving bans, parking fees,
toll rings and subsidies  to public  transport. 4 But when consumers  sacrifice  trips in response to demand
2 One must think  carefully  about  the units involved.  As an illustration  with  other goods,  think  of beer as an imperfect
substitute  for wine.  If wine  prices  go up,  beer consumption  would  swell,  and  in liters  possibly  by more  than  the observed
reduction  in  wine  consumption.  For  car use,  if a leisurely  trip (to  visit  grandma  or to go shopping)  is moved  from Wednesday
afternoon  to Saturday,  it may  very  well  end up being  a longer  trip.
' An admittedly  unrepresentative  survey  (100 households  surveyed  for a newspaper  at a fee-charging  parking  lot) found  39
percent  of drivers  stating  that  an additional  car had  been  their  response  to  the regulation
4 We  shall  use pollution as metaphor  for the policy  objective  (which  may be pollution, congestion,  etc.), and trips or gasoline
as  metaphor  for  associated  goods,  services  and inputs.  Congestion  charges  and  pollution  charges  are first-best  instruments:
if  they  are used,  reductions  are  provided  at the lowest  possible  welfare  costs.  Often,  and  some  times  with  good  reason  (such
as  the high  costs  of monitoring  individual  flows  of  emissions)  such  instruments  are not in  use. Eskeland  (1994) and  Eskeland
and  Devarajan  (1995)  show  how  many  real  world  pollution  control  strategies  could  be improved  by including  instruments
that discourage  car use  directly.  The reason  is that  existing  programs provide  incentives  to make  cars and  fuels  cleaner
(standards),  but  fail  to  discourage  their  use. Bemdt  and  Botero  (1985)  and Eskeland  and  Feyzioglu  (1994)  estimate  demand4
management instruments, what are their welfare costs of doing so? We shall make the simplifying
assumption  that  transfers of income can be made costlessly with other instruments - between
households, and between the private and the public sector. This allows us to abstract from analysis
of income distribution effects, and to apply no penalty or premium to public revenue generation.
Importantly,  when a trip is sacrificed  due to a marginal  increase  in the gasoline price, the value
of  the  sacrificed unit  to  the  consumer is the  retail  price of  gasoline. Thus, while there  are
inframarginal  units of gasoline  (and trips) that are worth more to consumers, a gasoline price increase
will screen out, systematically,  the trips that are worth the least. This property of the gasoline tax
allows it to reduce trips at the lowest possible welfare cost.
Demand reductions  resulting  from a regulation  will  rarely have this selection  quality. The "Day
without a car program" may curtail  trips in households  with a very high willingness  to pay, and it may
block a household's Tuesday-driving, say, even if the household could more easily have sacrificed
other trips. Both of these effects  resultbecause the regulation does not allow 'trading' of the rationed
commodity,  with the result that the regulation curtails inframarginal as well as marginal trips.  If we
compare it with a gasoline tax that would have yielded the same demand reduction as a regulation,
the unit costs  of the demand reductions delivered by the regulation will be at least as high, and
possibly much higher.  An illustrative comparison of the welfare cost of a regulation and a tax
increase calibrated  to give the same demand  reductions  is shown in Figure I below. A key assumption
in this argument is that the regulation, if providing emission reductions at all, would provide these
through its impact on aggregate gasoline consumption. Then, using market forces to allocate any
reductions  (in gasoline  consumption,  this time, rather than in emissions) will assist in containing the
costs of the reductions.
relationships  in Mexico,  finding  demand  elasticities  for gasoline  in  the range  of -0.7 to -1.25.5
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Figure 1:
The crossed  area in the,figure to the right illustrates the extra costs when the demand
reduction is found  on different parts of the demand curve, rather than squeezed to
the right, selecting the least essential trips, as a tax increase would.
With the  particular rationing mechanism used in Mexico  City, issues are slightly more
complex, because the demand reductions provided by the regulation are unknown. First, the ration
applies  to the utilization of a plant (the vehicle) which was not at the outset fully utilized (24 hours
a day, 7 days a week). For this reason, if users can move trips from one day to another, or exchange
car services  (on Tuesdays, I drive twice my distance, to pick you up, and on Thursdays, you return
my favor), vehicle  kilometers  may  remain unchanged  by the regulation even if the number of vehicles
were to remain  the same. Second, households  can purchase  an additional car, thereby purchasing four
work-day "driving-permits" and 2 weekend "permits". This could increase the total car stock in
Mexico City  or redistribute car ownership between households with different utilization rates 5. The
latter opportunity places, in effect, an upper bound on the costs of compliance for a household: no
household will be subject to a higher cost of compliance than the costs of holding an additional car
(for  many households, the upper bound is lower,  since an additional car would yield benefits
additional  to substituting  for the other car on the banned day). The effect on total driving will depend
I There  is casual  evidence  that  Mexico  City  has  attracted  used  cars  from  the rest of the country.6
on the effect on the total car stock,  as well as on the distribution of cars amongst households
according to usage. We turn now to the estimation of the effect on total driving, as measured by
aggregate gasoline demand in the Metropolitan Area.
3. Aggregate Gasoline Consumption
In this section,  we investigate  the behavior of the aggregate gasoline consumption in Mexico
City  Metropolitan  Area around the time of the ban.  We trace the consumption pattern from January
1987 through December  1992. The consumption level is given in Figure 3; driving ban became
effective  approximately  in the middle  of the sample. We assume that aggregate gasoline consumption
in Mexico City depends on gasoline price and income: 6
c=  ±o+a,p,+ay,  +e,  t=1,...,T  (1)
where, ct is the total gas consumption, R is the weighted average of the gasoline prices (types of
gasoline,  by share in total use), and y, is income. All variables  are in logarithms, therefore coefficients
a, and a, are interpreted as price and income elasticities.
The hypothesis is, of course, that the imposition of the restriction changes consumption
pattems, i.e. shifts  the demand function (1).  Such a change can be in the form of an alteration of the
level of consumption, with no change in the elasticities,  change in the elasticities without any change
in the level,  or both. To capture these possible changes, it is standard to introduce a dummy variable
that is zero before  the restriction  was imposed,  and one after. This dummy variable and its interaction
with price and income would indicate statistically  discernible changes in the demand function related
to the restriction.
To test the zero hypothesis  that the demand  function has been changed, we estimate equation
(1)  with dummy variables for the periods under regulation.  The estimation technique and tests
applied are discussed in Appendix L.7 The estimated elasticities are given in Table 1.
6 Other  variables  like  congestion  factor,  overall  car quality,  number  of cars  would  have  helped,  but are not available.
'Quarterly  data  are used.  Appendix  I describes  the data,  and  examines  the series  for properties  related  to the econometric
estimation.  We  conclude  after  testing  for  unit roots,  stationarity  etc.  that  ordinary  least  squares  estimation  is appropriate.7
Table 1:
Estimated  Gasoline  Demand  Function:  Elasticities'
Without  Regulation  Under  Regulation  Probability  of
no change
Gasoline  Price  -0.24  -0.06  0.05
Income  0.83  1.63  0.05
The key result  is that there is a substantial  change in the gasoline demand function associated
with the regulation. While  consumption  becomes more elastic  with respect to income, it becomes less
elastic  with respect  to gasoline  prices. Levels,  in terms of the estimated constant, shifts too.  We can
see the effect of the change in the demand  function  for the relevant income and price ranges in Figure
2. The constancy terrn has shifted downward, but in the area of  observation the demand surface
under regulation is above the demand surface without regulation. This is related to the fact that the
price and income  elasticities  have shifted  upwards, (the price elasticity downwards in absolute terms).
To  quantify the change in gasoline consumption, we simulate consumption to establish a
counterfactual -- as if the regulation had not been implemented. We estimate the demand function
based only on data from the period  before the regulation and simulate the counterfactual for demand
developments in subsequent periods 9. The simulated values are shown in Figure 3, together with
realized demand figures. The figure also shows a 95% confidence interval for the simulation of
demand without the regulation.  The simulation indicates that, had the demand system not been
subjected to a structural shift at the end of 1989, demand would have been lower in all but the two
first quarters after the regulation (within the confidence of pluc minus one standard deviation of the
estimated coefficients).'
8 The  estimated  constant,  which  also  changed,  is not shown.
'We use  materialized  values  of price  and  income  for  years  1990  to the end  of 1992  and plug  them  into  the function  estimated
for the first  period,  to produce  the demand  simulation.  We thus assume  that  the structural  change  in the demand  system
would  not  have  occurred,  but that  the exogenous  variables,  gasoline  prices  and  income,  would  have  developed  as they  did.
'°  In another  simulation,  we focused  on the uncertainty  ex ante, insertingforecasts of price and income in the demand  model,
using  univariate  forecasts  (assuming  that  the shocks  to the demand  system  were  known,  but future  developments  in prices
and  income  were  not). When  taken  individually,  price  looks  like  a white  noise,  and  income  is stationary  around  a positive
trend.  We  forecast  price  using  only  its mean,  and income  using  the estimated  trend. The  results  are more  dramatic:  These8
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ex ante simulations zive lowver  demand than those realied.  Realized demand is outside the confidence interval  for all but
one observation (note that the confidence intervals do not tak-e  into account that the variables used are forecasted too).9
The enforcement  of the ban is considered  to be at least partially  successful.  While  it is not
impossible  that  the regulation  should  increase  usage  per car (if one drives  extra to "drive  around"  the
regulation  - driving  longer  to pick  up a friend  than you save when being  two in a car) a more likely
explanation  is  that  the regulation  provoked  an increase  in the  number  of cars in the Metropolitan  Area
- since  each car implicitly  comes  with four "work-day  driving  permits".
If the regulation  leads  to some  increased  car purchases  in subsequent  periods,  while  incomes
grow, then this could partly be reflected  in an expanded  income elasticity  for gasoline demand.
Similarly,  gasoline  prices  increased  after  the regulation,  but the estimate  for the price  elasticity  in that
period  could  be suppressed  by two effects:  car stocks  were given  a boost simultaneously,  and  the car
stock  could  perhaps  have  been  shifted  to some  extent  from  marginal,  price sensitive  users  to less price
sensitive  users.
One  way  of interpreting  the findings  from the aggregate  time series  model,  therefore,  is that
many  vehicle-owning  households  in the outset were in a situation  and an income  range  for which  an
additional  vehicle  would be the best response  when  the service  flow from each  vehicle  was partially
expropriated".  To examine  this hypothesis,  we now  turn to data from a general-purpose  household
expenditure  survey  from the year 1989.  It was executed  before the regulation,  and we will  use it to
study  the socioeconomic  determinants  of vehicle  ownership.
4. Household  Behavior
In this section,  we look at the car ownership  from a household  perspective.  The advantage
of such  an approach  is that  the determinants  of car ownership  at the household  level  can yield  insights
about likely individual  reactions  to a driving  ban. We first present a model  of car ownership:  a
discrete  choice  model  with household  characteristics  and socioeconomic  variables  as determinants.
We  then  use household  data from  Mexico  City  to estimate  the model  parameters,  using cross  section
variation  from a period prior to the ban. We then  make the assumption  that demand  for the service
flow  of  vehicles  is  the motivation  for owning  vehicles,  and use the model  to simulate  behavior  when
"  The "additional  car" for those in the outset  owning  a vehicle  is a simplification,  based on the presumption  that the
regulation  reduces  the service  flow  only  for those  presently  owning  vehicles.  If one vehicle  in  the outset  were providing
services  to  several  households,  say,  bringing  three  household  heads  to  work  every  day,  one  would  see  the regulation  cutting
service  flows  to  two  non-owning  households  as well,  one of which  could  purchase  its first  vehicle  as a result.10
part of the flow is expropriated by the driving ban. Finally, we interpret the results.
4.1 Model
Households  are  constantly faced with the decision of allocating their  scarce resources
optimally  across durables  and non-durables (as well as savings). Let us assume that a durable (such
as a car) is owned because of the value of the service flow it offers, and that households behave
optimally  given their preferences, constraints and resources. Then, for all households owning a car,
the net value of the service flow, after subtracting short term variable costs, exceeds the fixed costs
of owning the car.
We concentrate  on their allocation decisions between car services and other goods and
services, assuming that car ownership affects household utility through the net value of its service
flow and the budgetary resources demanded." 2 Each household's  allocation decision depends on
characteristics determining its need and desire for car services, as well as on their income.  For
example, we expect a car to be more useful the more the people there are in the household, due to
economies  to scale  in utilizing the car's capacity. At the same time, however, for a given household
income,  more individuals  may make a car less affordable. Another expected effect is that cars are in
higher  demand  the higher the wages, since higher  wages increase  the value of time savings for a given
household income.
As distant analysts, we observe the household's choices and a partial list of the household
characteristics  that could be  associated with these choices.  We proceed  in two  steps: (i) to
understand what, among the characteristics we observe, determines how many cars a household
decides to own, and (ih)  to use this understanding to predict how their choices would change when
the service flow from each car is restricted.
We assume that the household maximizes a  household utility function subject to a budget
constraint:
U(TCSI,OC)  i = 1, 2, ..., m  (2)
12  Ben-Akiva and Lerman discusses in detail the assumption underlying discrete choice modelling, emphasizing car
ownership and travel mode choice models. Berkovec (1985) estimates a car ownership model based on U.S. data.11
I, = pp,  + pOC,  (3)
where,  U is the utility function for household  i,  TCS, is the transportation services household i
obtains from the its cars, D,, OC, is the consumption of all other goods and services, T  is the total
expenditure  of household  i, p. is the annualized cost of owning and using a car, and p0 is the price of
all other goods and services.' 3
We restrict the choices  to three: no car, one car, and two or more cars;  this is to simplify  the
notation and to be consistent  with the underlying  data.  1
4 We assume that the value of the service flow
family i obtains from owning j  cars is a function of the characteristics of the family:
TCS,j =  f,(z)  j  =  O, 1, 2.  (4)
where z, is a vector of household  characteristics,  andf (z)  allows corresponding differences amongst
households in the utility they gain from services ofj  cars.  A household would optimally choose to
own one car only if more cars, and no cars, both would make it worse off.
We shall  introduce the possibility  that the household's car ownership decision also depends
on unobserved  variables. Then, the observed variables are determinants of the probability  of a
household ovwningj cars, since some of the household's unobserved characteristics may lead them
to choose a different number of cars.  We assume that on average, the effects of these unobserved
characteristics  add up to zero. Hence, the the assumption  that the observed choice,  y, =j,  is optimal
implies that the probability of household i choosing j  vehicles is the probability that its total utility
is maximized by owningj  vehicles' 5:
Prob(y, =j)  = Prob(U,)  > U,(k)),  k,j = O, 1, 2,  kj  i = 1, 2, ..,m.  (5)
3 Prices  in  this cross-section  of households  from Mexico  City  are assumed  to  be uniform.
4 In our  data  of 1037  households,  only  2%  possess  more  than 2.
This  is a  joint  probability  distribution:  Uj) > U(i),  and Uf) > U(k),  j # k, j, i. For  a similar  modelling,  see Manski  and
McFadden  (1981).12
where k,j=2 denotes two or more cars. The model lets us analyze  the possible effect of a driving ban.
A driving ban would diminish the total  car services a household gets, which in turn effect the
probabilities of owning a car.  Such modifications are discussed in sections 4.3 and 5.
4.2 Results
Car ownership is given by equation (5).  This probability can be  expressed in terms of
observables  once we assume that household  utilities  are linear in their arguments and that errors have
a log Weibull distribution:" 6
2
Prob(y,  =j)  = exp(X8)1/(j  exp(XJ3,)),  j  = 0,1,2  i = 0,I,...,m  (6)
k=O
where X, includes household characteristics as well as total expenditure (one may interpret total
expenditure  as a proxy for disposable  income). Household characteristics and total expenditure feed
into the utility functions through the coefficients /,3, 8,, and #.  For example,  Pi  tells us the
importance  of each of the household characteristics and income in determining the value of one car,
relative to none, and  82, similarly,  for two cars.  If XX#,  is greater than V(4 and  .A[,  household i
would choose to own one car.  Since  utility  functions are estimated on the basis of ordinal rankings,
the interpretation  of the coefficients is how the variable increases the utility of havingj  cars, as
opposed to having zero cars.
As household characteristics, we used number of children in the household (Child), number
of adults  (Adult: proxying,  perhaps inter alia, for driver's licenses), number of people with high level
and intermediary level education (HighEd) and (MedEd), and average wages earned by the wage
earners (WagePW).  The vector of exogenous variables include these household variables plus a
constant (C), and total expenditure (TotExp), which we may interpret as disposable income.
We estimate the parameters of the model by maximizing the multinomial logit likelihood
function  that is defined  in Appendix  2.  We use a two step procedure: first maximizing the likelihood
1  See Appendix 2 for the derivation.13
function  with respect to all variables, subsequently re-estimating the model using only the variables
that were significant in the first step.  The results are given in Appendix 2, Table A2.  1. To give an
impression of how well the model fits actual car ownership, we compare actual with predicted in
Appendix 2, Table A2.2.  The results indicate that the more children a household has, or  the more
of the members  have higher education,  the more they prefer to have a car, given similar incomes. The
importance of education and wages per worker is higher for  the second car.  Approximately 72%
of the households' car ownership decision is captured by the model.
4.3 Simulation of a reduction in the serviceflowfrom  each car
In this section, we use our model of car ownership  to examine the likely response to a driving
ban. We take the estimated utility  functions  as given,  and use the parameters to simulate the response
to the car useage restriction.'"
The ban effectively  reduces  the service  flow a household  gets from each car it ows.  If it owns
more than one car, then we make the simplifying  assumption that it can substitute one for another on
the restricted  days, so the restriction has little or no effect'".  Such a reduction in car services due to
a ban is reflected in the model as follows: for households with one car, the utility becomes
U(a *  TCS, OC)  (7)
where  a,  summarizes the  effective car useage restriction for one car.,  a  is equal to  one for
7This  approach  is potentially  vulnerable  to  a "Lucas  critique: There  is no guarantee  the regulation  would  not also  change
the  parameters  of  the  estimated  car  ownership  model.  However,  given  the  aim  and  ambition  of  this  study,  the  assumption
that  the  estimated  pararneters  are  not  themselves  changed  by  the  ban  seems  to be a plausible  baseline  for  the  analysis  of the
likely  response  to a ban.  The  nature  of  the  experiment  is  to assurne  that  we  know  something  about  how  the  value  of  car
ownership  will  be changed.  We  perform  sensitivity  analysis  and  discuss  potential  weaknesses  in the  concluding  section.
8If  the  household  has  only  one  driver,  this  would  be accurate.  For  a two-driver  household,  the  regulation  cuts  the  service
flow  from  two  cars  5 workdays  to  2 cars  3 workdays  and  I car  2 workdays.  Thus,  if a two-car  household  would  otherwise
use  its  second  car  only  3  days  a week,  this  assumption  is accurate.  Otherwise,  it is an  approximation,  and  it  would  be wrong
if households  with  two  cars have  the same  difficulty  managing  without  every  car on each  workday  as has a one-car
household.  Our  modelling  assumptions  should  be interpreted  as the  effective  reduction  in  the  value  of  the  service  flow  for
a one  car  household  in comparison  to a multicar  household.14
households  with more  than one car, and no change is also assumed for households without any car'9.
For households with one car, if travel days have no substitutability and the car is used only every
workday, a,  amounts  to 4/5, if the car is used approximately  evenly acoss the week and the weekend,
then a, would be 6/7. IfHa  household  can comply  with the restriction without losing any service value
(say, it is used for some trips every week, but they can be moved from one day to another without
any costs) then a, would be 1, and on the other extreme, if the household needs the car exactly on
the day the restriction is binding, a, would be 0. This latter case represents an unlikely possibility,
given that  the car registry process as well as the car market allows owners to  influence which
weekday is banned for their car.
Once the value of the car's service flow is restricted, the households' optimization problems
have changed (we assume, in these calculations, that prices do not change, including those of used
cars). Households  for whom the value of the service flow at the outset only marginally exceeded car
ownership  costs may  want to sell  their car. Others, on the other hand, will buy additional cars.  Some
households  that owned only one car may now find a second car justified because it can substitute for
the  expropriated service flow and perhaps provide additional services.  Finally, we assume that
households without cars will not change their behavior, since optimization theory implies that an
added constraint can change the optimal choice only if it bars the originally optimal choice.
In Figure 4a, we have illustrated  the main mechanisms, by "condensing" the model to a two-
dimensional  one: utility  as a function of income  given that the household owns zero, one or two cars.
For each household, a separate utility level is calculated under three different pre-regulation
scenarios:  given that it owns zero cars (U0), given that it owns one car (U,), and given two or more
cars  (U2).  We plot these utilities against their income levels. 20 Given their income and other
"  Loosely speaking, optimization theory shows that a constraint making cars less useful can change behavior only for
households that would, in the absence of the constraint, want to have a car.  We shall see later that a it may be overly
simplistic to describe the regulation as merely making cars less useful: if it reduces congestion, it might make the road
network more useful, and cars more useful to some, including  to some that would otherwise choose not to own cars.
20  The curves are drawn as follows: For Ul, use the estimated one-car coefficients, plugging in the variables for each
household  in the data  set in, to calculate 1037 utility levels, given that they have one  car.  Next, regress these utility levels
in a univariate OLS model to  a constant and  total expenditure. For U2, follow the same procedure, but with the two-car
coefficients. U0 is only a comparator - the horizontal line. U1', utility as a function of income given one car under the
restriction, is calculated  using a shift parameter alpha of .8 (see text).15
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characteristics,  households  choose the number of vehicles that give them the highest utility. We can
see that each of the conditional  utility  functions U 0, U, and U2 has an income range for which it gives
the highest  utility.  This is the income range for which that specific number of cars is optimal. For the
lowest income range, U 0 is highest, so zero cars is the optimal choice for households in that range.
As income increases, the utility of having one car increases (the slope of  U 0 is normalized to zero).
In the income range to the right of  where U 0 and U, intersect, households typically own one car.
At an even higher income range, households typically own two or more cars.
U,'  shows the utility of having one car after the restriction is imposed, using a restriction
factor of 80% (i.e. 80 percent of the service flow remains). As compared to U,, U,' lies lower, and
we thus have a reduction in the size of the income range for which one car is the optimal choice.
Actually, two new income ranges of  relevance  appear. The first one represents an income range for
which the optimal number of cars has shifted from one to zero. These households, in this simplistic
model, would sell  their car 21. Another effect of substituting U,' for U, is a range of incomes in which
households would want to expand vehicle ownership from one to two (or more).  The two zones
reflect that the income threshold that a household needs to have passed in order to buy its first car
has moved upwards, while the income threshold for buying a second car has moved downwards.
Figure 4b graphs the income distribution of the households surveyed. We can see that there
is a greater  density of households in the range of sellers than in the range of buyers, but the latter
range is larger. Finally, the latter region is supported by greater per-household incomes.
For sensitivity  analysis,  we can use alternative  restriction  factors to calculate the total number
21 Simplicity  refers  in  particular  to (i) used  car prices,  and  (ii) sunk  costs. Used  car prices  are assumed  to be unaffected  by
the  ban.  When  part  of the  service  flow  from  cars  is expropriated,  ceteris  paribus  the value  of used  cars would  fall. However,
for  the  regulation  in  question,  cars  simultaneously  are given  a value  as bundles of implicit  driving  permits,  so the effect  of
the  regulation  on  (used)  car prices is not known  a priori.  The  working  assumption  underlying  the estimation  of who  would
buy  and  who would  sell cars is: given  that  used-car  prices are unchanged.
A separate  simplification  is when  we abstract  from  the sunk  cost aspect  of investing  in a car. If car purchases
involve sunk costs (households  would  generally  make  a loss if first purchasing,  then selling  a car, even if it has not
deteriorated),  then  uncertainty  would  lead  households  not t o invest  before  they  have  progressed  far into  the income  region
in which  they  would  like  to hold a car. This  effect,  not reflected  in this analysis,  introduces  an asymmetry  if a regulatory
change  reduces  the service  flow  from  a car:  owners  who  would  want to sell,  had there  been  no sunk  costs involved,  will
hesitate,  and  many  of  them  will  not  sell.  No corresponding  hesitation  applies  to the households  that  would  want to  purchase
an additional  car. These  effects  are explored  in the option  pricing  theory  (not  buying  a car leaves  you  with  the option  of
buying  one  later),  and  this  particular  effect  is called  hysteresis  (Dixit  and  Pindyck,  1994,  pg 136).  In a market  for used  cars,
transactions  costs may be high  due to asymmetric  information  about quality,  giving a theoretical  underpinning  for the
existence  of sunk  costs  (Akerlof,  1970).17
of cars to be bought and sold as a result  of the restriction,  maintaining  the simplifying  assumptions
that there are no transaction  costs for cars and that prices do not change. Results for different
restriction  coefficients  are given  in Table  4.
Table  4
Simulation  of the  Effects  of the Regulation
(as percentage  of predicted  car stock)
a,  Sellers  Buyers
0.95  5%  3%
0.90  8%  6%
0.85  11%  8%
0.80  14%  12%
0.75  18%  16%
The  model indicates  that, for restriction  factors  in the range of .8 to .9, about 10 percent of
car-owners  would want to  adjust the number of cars they own. It also indicates,  however, a
somewhat  greater  number  of  "sellers"  than  of "buyers".  Thus,  if  the model  were completely  adequate,
and  Mexico  City  were a closed  economy,  one  would  expect  used-car  prices  to be shifted  downwards
as a result of the restriction,  to allow  net car purchases  to be zero in equilibrium 22. Most observers
believe  that Mexico  City imported  used cars from the rest of the country,  implying  that, in reality,
more households  wanted  to buy  than sell. Such a finding  would  also be more consistent  with our
finding in section  one - an increase  in total gasoline  consumption  is most easily  explained  by an
increase  in the total number  of cars registered.
Our analysis  can not be used  to shed  more light  on that question,  apart from showing  that a
very  simplistic  model  results  in a number  of sellers  in the same order of magnitude  as the number  of
buyers.  As  we have  noted  (footnote  18),  one  of the simplifying  assumption,  the absence  of sunk  costs
in  car purchases,  could  imply  that  we overestimate  the number  of households  that would  want to sell,
'  Used car "values" for Mexico are provided only for insurance purposes, and reflect standard depreciation factors rather
than market conditions.18
whith no similar bias for the number of buyers. There are many other ways in which the analysis is
overly simplistic,  however, such as the lumping together of all multi-car households in  a category
owning two or more cars,  and the assumption that underlying parameters are not changed by the
regulation.
The contribution  given  by this section  was (i) to provide a theoretical model of car ownership,
showing how a regulation creates buyers as well as sellers, and (ii)  estimate a simple model to
explore  orders of magnitude.  While  the model cannot be said to lend direct support for an expansion
in car ownership  in Mexico City as a result of the regulation, it indicates that the number of "buyers"
will be substantial.
5. Congestion, and week-end travel: An attempted Reconciliation
In the above cross section model,  the direct way in which the regulation works is to make cars
less useful.  As such, one would expect a reduced interest in car ownership, as indeed the model
indicates. Even in the simplistic model estimated, however, increased aggregate interest in car
ownership  could not be ruled out a priori. Taking the restriction  factor of 90% as a point of reference,
however  (Table 4), the model indicates  that interest in car ownership would fall by about two percent
(8 percent of car owners would sell,  6 percent would buy). In contrast, the model based on time series
analysis of aggregate gasoline demand - the only one which includes analysis of post-regulation
behavior  - indicates that the use of cars  were increased. In this section we discuss features not
included in the ownership model which could account for its lack of consistency with observed
consumption levels. The arguments will explore additional model features, and whether plausible
parameter values can reconcile the findings.
First, let us note that the ownership model assumes that the regulation reduces the service
flow from your car ceteris paribus. With high congestion levels, as the service flow from other cars
is reduced as well, congestion  levels will go down, travel speeds will pick up, in turn making the car
more useful to you. To explore this effect, let demand, v' (we now represent the vehicle and its
services  with one variable,  abstracting  from the distinction between ownership and use) consist of an
exogenous component, k, and a component sensitive to travel time, t (say, the average time that it
takes you to drive to work, given the congestion levels) Vd  = k + v(t). Further, to describe the road19
network's  capacity, let travel time be a  function of demand, t=t(v). If the regulation makes a
reduction in the exogenous component of demand, k, the equilibrium effect will be dampened by a
resurge due to increased speeds (details in Appendix 3):
dV  d  (8
dk= CV,1 EtXV+l  (8)
The first elasticity  (travel demand with respect to times) is negative. The latter  (The elasticity of the
road network's supply of travel time, with respect to additional entering vehicles) is positive, so the
speed-induced resurge implies that any direct effect that a regulation will have on demand will be
dampened. We can see that if either of the elasticities - or both - is zero, the equilibrium effect on
demand will simply  be the direct effect: a car removed from the streets on Tuesday simply reduces
overall traffic on Tuesday by one car. On the other hand, if the two elasticities mulitiplied by each
other approaches minus one, then the equilibrium reduction after reducing traffic by one car on
Tuesday is approaching  zero - since other vehicles enter the roads to take advantage of the reduced
congestoin.
To speculate  on likely parameters, we solve (Appendix 4) a model in which cars are bought
partly because of the time savings they offer, r, partly because consumers derive utility from their
services  (lV  is the difference between the travel time by alternative mode and the travel time by car,
so the elasticities  differ  in sign  and by the fraction of time savings to travel time - which may be one).
The model shows that:
-_w4
pv  IV--  v,pc
Thus, the elasticity  of vehicle  demand  with respect  to time savings  is equal to minus the elasticity with
respect to vehicle prices, corrected for the role that the value of time savings play in motivating car
purchases: w  -/pv. Thus, assuming that the value of time savings, w r justifies three quarters of the
costs of car ownership  and use (i.e the car also delivers  some "direct" utility, apart from time savings,
accounting for 25 percent of its value), then the elasticity of vehicle demand with respect to time
savings is three quarters of the elasticity with respect to the costs of owning and using a car. Thus,20
since demand elasticities with respect to price for cars, or for gasoline (a combination would better
reflect ownership  and use) are often  found in the range of-.5 to -1.25  (See Eskeland and Feyzioglu,
1994, or Bemdt and Botero, 1985), values for the demand elasticity with respect to travel times in
the range of -. 5 to -I would appear plausible.
For supply conditions, only a few estimates exist in the literature for how travel times (or
speeds)  respond to additional  vehicles  entering the road, and none exist for Mexico City. In severely
congested  conditions the elasticity is greater than one, meaning that the entry to the road (or the
network) of an additional  vehicle reduces the total throughput of a road link. From Kenneth Small's
book ("Urban Transport Economics, model 3.5, page 70 - no link to Mexico City), an elasticity of
2.5 reflects conditions in the middle of a range. Turning back to equation 8, above, we can see that
combinations of demand and supply elasticities  which would allow the resurge in demand to "wipe
out" almost all of a reduction  in traffic is not implausible;  a demand  elasticity of -.  8 found by Eskeland
and Feyziogly,  for instance, would result in a travel time demand elasticity of .6, which requires the
supply  elasticity  to be not higher  than 1.  5. The congestion-induced resurge can, however, only make
an adjustment to the direct demand reduction approaching but not surpassing hundred percent'.
Thus, even with some additional trE rel demand due to greater speeds, an initial, direct reduction of
vehicle demand can only be reduced - it can not be changed into an increase 24.
So how, then, could a reduction in traffic on weekdays - however slight it be - conceivably
result in an increase?  One unmodelled  mechanism  that could reconcile these findings is to distinguish
between weekdays and weekends. It is evident that total gasoline consumption could increase if the
increase  in weekend travel resulting from the regulation is as large as the reductions in weekday
travel. If weekend travel was perfectly substitutable with week -day travel, all trips suppressed on
weekdays would show up as weekend trips, but such an effect is not necessarily plausible. Now,
however,  we  have seen that  a  significant share  of  an initial reduction  in week-day travel  is
compensated  fbr by a resurge on the same weekdays in congestion sensitive travel. Then it is not so
2  Thus,  in the case of traffic,  we can preclude effects  like the one observed for Baseball audiences by Yogi Barra:"Nobody
comes to the stadium anymore -it's too crowded".
24 The stability condition  that a reduction  in traffic should not lead to an increase in traffic is a very plausible one: as soon
as the resurge  in traffic  approaches  hundred  percent  of the removed traffic, travel times are actually approaching those under
the initial conditions,  so the travel-time sensitive  part of demand can hardly surpass the hundred percent point.21
implausible  that an increase  in total driving  could  be the result of a regulation  on work-day  driving  -
though  it does imply  that more  travel  is one of the costs of less convenient  travel.
6. Summary and conclusions
We  estimated a  demand function based on time  series, aggregate data, to  analyze the
aggregate  reductions in driving resulting from the driving ban. The time series analysis indicated
strongly that total car use in Mexico City was shifted upwards by the regulation, indicating that
positive  net car purchases  should  play  a major  role  (since  one would  expect  the many  households  that
would not increase car ownership to reduce, or  keep unchanged, their car use).
Assuming that car owinership  is motivated by  the service flow that cars offer, we then
introduced a model of the individual  household's  ownership decision. Using household survey data
from Mexico City to estimate the model, we simulated individual  responses to the ban. This model
showed that some households would want to buy more cars as a result of the regulation, while a
somewhat greater number of households would want to reduce their number of cars.
The cross section model has a known weakness in the assumption that cars are bought and
sold without transaction costs, and that car prices would be unchanged by the regulation. The first
of these could mean that many  households  predicted  to sell  would not want to sell, so that the number
of predicted sellers is overestimated. Thus, the model sheds some light on the observation that the
regulation  increased total  car use.  It  shows that  adjustments in car ownership status will be
significant, and thus that increased car ownership in Mexico City would not be implausible, even
though it is not directly predicted by the model.
We then noted features excluded  in the model.  One is that congestion sensitive travel demand
could  imply  that a resurge in travel demand on weekdays due to reduced congestion could eliminate
much of the direct travel reduction. If, then, some supressed weekday trips would show up as
weekend  trips (or if some extra travel is part of the consequences of inconvenient travel) -then more
of the pieces in the puzzle may be in place. Another is that use-weighted travel may have shifted
towards less fuel efficient cars, opening the possibility that aggregate gasoline consumption would
increased even if travel were constant or slightly reduced,
From  the  perspective of  policy making, the  lessons are  somewhat stronger  than our22
confidence  in the estimated sign of the change in car use. The reason is that any reduction in car use
can be achieved by instruments which, if we refer to theory and invoke the compensation criterion,
can always  provide the reductions at a lower social cost than a regulation. Thus, even if one rejects
the conclusion  that aggregate car usage was increased,  one may see the small reductions as evidence
that  the  rationing scheme resulted  in high compliance costs  for  many households. The  high
compliance  costs are an important lesson in itself, but not less so if many sought a compliance
strategy which implied that they offered negative or zero reductions in car use. Finally, if that
compliance strategy involved acquiring a used car with lower technical standard, it could result in
contributions to accidents and pollution which are worse than what is indicated by total gasoline
consumption.
One should observe, finally, that the arguments about social costs in this study do not imply
that we have analyzed consequences in terms of income distribution across households. Indeed,
disentangling  the income distribution effects of awarding driving permits to existing and future cars,
while  expropriating  a certain  fraction of these, would be a sizeable  analytical task.  We have abstained
from analyzing  them (and comparing them to those of alternative demand management instruments)
for this reason, but also because we suspect more important distributional goals would pertain to
households  not owning cars, and that other policy instruments could attain likely distributional goals
at lower social costs25.
5  Eskeland  and  Kong  (in process)  analyzes  distributional  implications  of various  pollution  control  strategies  for Indonesia
(a  study  for  Mexico,  by other  authors,  is in  progress).23
Appendix 1
Time Series Properties and Estimation Results
of the Aggregate Data
A1. I Time Series Properties:
In this section,  we analyze  the time series properties of each variable separately. There are
two issues that we pay special attention to: seasonality and non-stationarity. Test results for each
series are reported in Table Al. 1.
Table  Al.1
Time  Series  Properties  of Aggregate  Data
Gasoline  Consumption  Gasoline  Price  Income
Unit Root  in ACF  No  No  No
Unit Root in ADF  No  Yes  No
Deterministic  trend  Yes  No  Yes
Seasonality  No  No  Yes
ACF:  Auto-Correlation  Function
ADF:  Augmented  Dickey-Fuller  Unit  Root Test
Given  these results,  we seasonally  adjust income. For price series, due to conflicting results from DF
and ACF, we made further tests.  Price in itself is not the focus point, but rather as a factor that
affects  consumption. We therefore run a regression with consumption, price and income. We know
that  consumption and income are stationary.  This implies that the residual will have the same
stationarity properties as the price.  Our tests show that the residual is stationary.  We  therefore,
conclude that, for our purposes, it is sufficient to model price as a stationary variable.24
Al.2  Regression Results:
We estimated equation (1) using OLS:
Table  A  1.2
Regression  of Aggregate  Gasoline  Consumption
Dependent  variable:  Ln(Total  Consumption)
Variable  Coefficient  Standard  error  1-tail  Significance
Constant  -7.93  5.40  0.08
Ln(Price)  -0.24  0.08  0.00
Ln(Income)  0.83  0.35  0.01
Dumnny  -12.57  7.02  0.05
Dummy*Ln(Price)  0.18  0.10  0.05
Dufmy*Ln(Income)  0.80  0.45  0.05
Adjusted  R-squared  0.96  F-statistic  113.04
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.99  Prob(F-statistic)  0.00
Dununy  =0  1987.1 t s 1989.4
1  1990.1  ￿  t ￿  1992.4.25
Appendix 2
Derivation and Estimation of
Household Choice Model
A2. 1 Derivation
First, we combine  the budget constraint  and the definition  of total transportation services from
cars with the utility function by substituting equation (3) and equation (4) into equation (2):
Uji  = Ut  fz)  (Ii -pD)lp.  (A2. 1)
where, U.,  is the utility of household i if it were to havej  cars.  Second, we assume that the utility
function is linear in its arguments:
Uj,  = u,, + e,,  j  = O,  1, 2  i = 1, 2, .,m.  (A2.2)
and 1 u,,  = X,j,.
Third,  we establish  the probability  distribution of owningj  cars.  For the the probability of i's
not owning any vehicle, we obtain
Prob(y, = 0) = Prob(Uo 0 > U,,),  k0o,
= Prob((eO-ej,  > ,uji-go, (eOj-e 2i > 921i-lo)  (A2.3)
If eji  has a log Weibull, then, the probability of choosingj  vehicles is a logistic function:
Prob(y, =j)  = exp(XI3)/(E  exp(X,)d),  j  = 0,1,2  i = O,l,...,m  (A2.4)
k=O
This is equation (6) in Section 4.
For estimation,  since  utility  is ordinal, we normalize utility to be zero for the case of no cars,
so that the model estimates the additional utility  from owning a positive number of cars.  The26
decision process is restated in terms of deviations from the utility of owning no cars:
2
Prob(y, =  j)  = exp(XAj )/(E  exp(XAk')),  j  = 0,1,2  i = 0,  I,...,m  (A2.5)
k=O
where X,8J'  = X}, -XBO. The decision  process of number of cars to own by all households can be put
together into a standard multinomial  logit likelihood  function:
mO  MOMI  mO mM 1+m2
L =I  P(y 1 = °)  I  P(y, = 1)  II  P(yj  = 2)  (A2.6)
i=l  i=m0,l  i=MO+mltl
where, mo, m,, and m 2 indicate  number  of households  in each cathegory  in the data set that is sorted
with respect to number of vehicles owned.
A2.2 Results
Results from household data are given in table A2.  1.
Table  A2.  1
U(j cars) - U(no car) =  + e
Variable  (X)  , (one  car)  P2 (two  or more  cars)






Second.  Lev.  0.20
Education  (0.08)
High  Lev.  Education  0.79  1.32
(0.  1 1)  (0.12)
Wage  per Worker  0.12  0.19
(0.03)  (0.03)27
Total Expenditure  1.62  1.87
(0.27)  (0.28)
Standard  errors  are  in paranthesis.  Some  vanrables  are  not  included  in the  second
column  of the  results  because  they  were  not  significant  in the  first  stage. All the
coefficients  are  significantly  different  from  zero  with  95%  confidence.
The interpretation  of the coefficients are as follows:  The coefficient of wage income is 0. 12
for I car, which means that if the average wage income of the household increases by 1, then the
extra utility they get from owning a car as opposed to not owning any is 0.12.  The corresponding
coefficient for 2 cars is 0. 19, which means that if wage income increases by 1, then the extra utility
of owning 2 cars as opposed to  I or no car is 0.07 and 0.19 respectively.  Similar interpretations
follow for the other coefficients.
The predictive power of the model is illustrated by in Table A2.2.
Table  A2.2
Car Ownership:  Actual  versus  Predicted
Predicted
No Car  I Car  2 Cars  Total
No Car  654  36  4  694
Actual  1 Car  172  60  17  249
2 Cars  25  38  31  94
Total  851  134  52  1037
Finally, while using a restriction factor of 0.8, as is used in Figures 4a and 4b, 33 come out
as sellers,  while  38 of the one-car households  would want an additional  car (these figures are reflected
in Table 4, line 4). As predicted percentages of the stock of cars among the  1037 households,
indicated purchases and sales come out as 12% and 14% respectively.28
Appendix 3
Equilibrium change in traffic when there is an exogenous change in demand for travel
The question  we ask in this section  is how travel responds  in equilibrium  if the road's capacity  to
supply  rapid  travel  times  is declining  in traffic  levels  and if travel demand  is sensitive  to congestion
levels.
Say demand for vehicle  use is the sum of two components:  one depends  on congestion  levels,
represented  by the time you will spend making  a certain  trip, I - the other demand  component  is
exogenously  given:
v= f(t)+k,
while the road-link's capacity  to get the vehicle through within a certain time depends on the
number  of vehicles  entering  the road:
I  g(v).
The following  condition  identically  represents  equilibrium:
v = f  (g(v))  + k
Imagine  now that a regulation  produces  a reduction  in the exogenous  part of travel demand.  For
equilibrium  travel,  we have:
dk-  a  +  &  EV  t,EV+1
The demand  elasticity  of travel  with respect  to travel  times  is negative  (travel  times go up, you are
less interested  in travelling),  while the supply elasticity  of travel times with respect to entering
vehicles  is positive  (more vehicles  on the road, traffic slows, travel time for a given trip rises).
Thus, unless  one of the elasticities  (or both) are zero, the equilibrium  effect  on travel will be less
than one, i.e. less than the exogenous reduction in demand.  A stability  condition is that the
multiplum  of the two elasticities  be greater  than minus  one - otherwise  a reduction  in traffic  would
lead to an increase  in traffic,  and we can see that any combination  of elasticities  which yields a
mulitiplum  close to or equal to minus  one would reflect "Downs law": any change leading  to a
reduction  of congestion  levels  would  immediately  lead to an increase  in travel  demand swamping
the initial  effect,  so that congestion  levels  are back at "normal".
More cautiously  argued,  what are plausible  values?  For supply,  we can immediately  establish  that
',  = 0 represents  an extreme  case of road conditions  in which  vehicle  density  is so low that an
additional vehicle does  not  slow down other vehicles. Positive values represents "natural
conditions"  in which  there is a positive shadow  price for road capacity  (natural  for urban roads
and intercity  highways,  see Hau, 1989) and values greater than one represents  heavily  congested29
conditions,  in which  and additional  vehicle  reduces  the total throughput of the road-link  per time
unit (a one percent increase  in entering  vehicles  increases  travel  times  for all vehicles  by more than
one percent).
For the elasticity  of travel demand with respect to travel times, what are plausible  values?  The
following  modelling  framework,  focusing  on vehicle  travel as a timesaving  alternative  to other
alternatives,  may  shed light  on that question.30
Appendix 4
A model with time savings as part of the motivation behind the demand for vehicles
Let utility be defined over cars, other goods and services, and leisure,  u = u(c,o,l),  and let the
individual budget constraint be  pcc + o = w(L + Icc - 1)  + I,  where the price of other goods and
services is normalized to one, Ic are the time savings offered per vehicle (c is to be interpreted as
a continuous variable - we may view this as a model of a representative  consumer), L  is the
endowment of human capital, and I is lump sum income.
The Lagrangian of the consumer's maximization  problem can be written:
L = u(c,o,l)-2(pc  -wlc)c+o-w(L  -1)-I)
The first-order conditions are:
I  i =-(Pc  - Wi )
w
U"~~~.
II  u,,1 =-
w
III  (pc  wlc)c + o - w(L - 1) - I)
where ua, Uoz  are marginal rates of substitution. The interpretation of the first equation is that the
value of time savings "justifies" parts of the costs of cars, and this part is subtracted from the cost,
PC / w,  that would otherwise be equated with the marginal rate of substitution between cars and
leisure.
To  study relationships between demand elasticities, let us differentiate the first-order conditions
with respect to the time savings offered per car:
al  e&  l,  u  ,l  a
+  +  -=  I
.c  c  c0  oYc  a  7  ac
?Cc  0  dd
-0 +  0l&+o 
.ic  c  cb  o7c  a7. ac
c  dc  da
Lt us ge a+m-+  w  th  = wc  m
Let us give name to the coefficient matrix:31
Z  c,  l
A =  aoI 0 ,li
P  -wl'  I  w
Assuming A is nonsingular, we may use Cramer's rule to solve for:
0  ,.  ac
JdcIAI=1  =  I  e°o
wc  1  w
Similarly,  when we differentiate the first-order conditions with respect to car prices, we obtain:
A=
Again using Cramer's rule, we have:
0  ata 1 __c_
a7  d
+|A=-1  e2 0 1 L
9 ,  .
-JAI=
c  w  c%  d7
-c  1  w
For matrix A, let Ck, be the cofactor of row k, columnj. We may write
-C  IAI  = C 21+ WC  C31
A=  -- C 2 1 -C  C31 -
Thuw
Thus:32
c  &  &  IC  Pcl  =>
-W  =>  _
a:-  j}C  07C  c  c)  Pc
Wic
EC,I  =  £C.Pcp
PC
Thus, the elasticity of car demand with respect to the time savings offered per car is wlp/pc  times
minus the  elasticity of  car demand with  respect  to  car  prices. Referring back  to  first-order
condition 1, we may see that  wlC/pc  is the share of time savings in justifying car purchases at the
margin (the other share being the direct utility drawn from cars):
-UdW  + Wll
Pc
It remains to relate the concept of time savings to the concept of travel times: an analysis of the
road is more likely to give you a change in travel times than a change in time savings.
So let us note that:
'b7c  c  &Ic  t  t
67'  a  a7  a7  c  l  ai  c
t
C,t =-c,6C  p
The adjustment thus is simply  the ratio of travel times to time savings offered by the car. It takes
positive values, and would often be in the range of .5 to 2. For instance, if your regular trip takes
you half an hour, and the alternative would have been a bus & walk combination that takes  I
hour, then both time savings and travel times are half an hour, and 
6c,  = -SC]'  On the other
hand, if your  car trip is twenty minutes and the alternative mode would take  you thirty, your
elasticity of travel demand with respect to travel time is double your elasticity of travel demand
with respect to time savings (not because of different behavioral response - rather because a given
change in travel time is smaller as a percent of travel time than as a percent of time savings, but it
leads to the same  change in travel demand.33
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